The Dougout

Lt. Colonel Bob Bateman is not only an Army officer but also holds a PhD in history, his specialty being military history. He is in strong disagreement with Victor Davis Hanson's "Western Way of War" thesis that Hanson has defined and explained in two books: The Western Way of War and Carnage and Culture. Bateman has promised a series of articles each dealing with each chapter of Carnage and Culture. There are many who disagree with Hanson thesis either in total or in part, myself included. Sadly, instead of sticking to "just the facts," Bateman has some need to make the issue personal. Bateman's title for the series is "Carnage, Culture and Crapola." The introduction is filled with vituperation and the first installment is not much better. Hanson has responded to the introduction at his blog "Work and Days." Pity, that what could have been an interesting and educational exchanged had to be marred by Bateman's invective.

Last year I wrote a paper on warfare in the early middle ages. I noted my disagreement with certain aspects of Hanson's thesis while maintaining civility.

Development of Carolingian and Saxon Warfare

The period from the battle of Poitiers in 732 A.D. to the battle of Lechfeld in 955 A.D. witnessed important changes in how Western European leaders organized, moved and engaged their military forces. The focus of this development was on the Frankish Merovingian and Carolingian states and Saxon led Germany that became the Holy Roman Empire. Accordingly this paper will have to omit events in Britain and Italy.

With reference to the Western Way of War thesis, proposed by Victor Davis Hanson and Geoffrey Parker, this period is of great interest because of the many non-Western enemies both the Franks and the Saxons encountered and battled. Particularly interesting in this regard was the fact that the Saxons for the first half of this period were “non-Western” adversaries of the Franks. The Saxons were able to quickly assimilate Western culture and became a bulwark against attack by non-Western forces. The Saxon experience demonstrated the political development from tribal allegiances to loyalties based on larger communities of either a religious nature (Christendom) or to a regional king (Holy Roman Emperor). This was a factor in allowing Western leaders to marshal larger forces that culminated with the multi-national and multi-ethnic army sent to Palestine during the Crusades. At issue is the nature of continuity in warfare from the classical to the early modern period. Hanson maintains that such continuity exists within a changing Western cultural context. Hanson’s describes Charles Martel’s Franks at the battle of Poitiers as a shield “wall” strongly reminiscent of Greek hoplites (Hanson, pp. 163; 139).

The two-hundred year period under discussion was instrumental in laying the foundations of Western military power throughout the rest of the Middle Ages; this military power rested upon the use of combined arms of whose composition and deployment on the battlefield was the result of both experience and careful planning. The many different types of enemy forces these early Western leaders had to deal with demonstrated the necessity of flexibility. These enemies included sea faring Vikings, Magyar horse archers and Saracen cavalry backed by a wealthy empire. The central location of both the Frankish and Saxon/German realms meant that both had to deal with enemies and invaders from all points of the compass. Western leaders had to adapt various military and political expedients in order to not just survive but thrive during this violent era.

Continue reading "Development of Carolingian and Saxon Warfare...."

Update, 31 October: Speaking of Medieval warfare, Gary Smailes has an excellent post on the Battle of Hastings (1066).